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I evaluate two processes, niche formation and resource-partitioning, that could independently
account for the entry of firms into new market segments in mature industries. The niche
formation argument focuses on environmental changes that promote the entry of new firms
whereas the research-partitioning argument is based on the internal differentiation of a mature
industry into subgroups composed of specialist and generalists. In other words, the niche
formation and resource-partitioning accounts emphasize forces that are exogenous and endogen-
ous to the industry, respectively. I attempt to resolve this theoretical tension by modeling the
effects of niche formation and resource-partitioning together on the founding of firms in the
microbrewery and brewpub segments of the U.S. brewing industry. I find that niche formation
provides a better explanation for both microbrewery and brewpub foundings. In addition, I
find limited evidence that the process of resource-partitioning is being played out again within
the microbrewery segment of the industry. Implications for the evolution of organizational
heterogeneity within industries are discussed. 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Strat. Mgmt. J., Vol. 19, 389–404, 1998
Historical records of several organizational popu-
lations show that most organizations within them
were founded in brief periods (Stinchombe, 1965;
Aldrich, 1979: 177). Stinchcombe (1965: 154)
notes that ‘an examination of the history of
almost any type of organization shows that there
are great spurts of foundation of organizations of
the type, followed by relatively slower growth,
perhaps to be followed bynew spurts, generally
of a fundamentally different kind of organization
in the same field.’ Sociologists explain this punc-
tuated pattern in foundings in terms of factors
affecting the distribution of resources in the
environment. These include the changing role of
the state, the development of a market-oriented
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economy, increasing levels of urbanization,
greater literacy because of better schooling, and
political revolution. Traditionally, this stream of
research has attempted to identify exogenous fac-
tors that affect the emergence of entirely new
organizational populations.
This study departs from the traditional
approach by examining processes that drive a
new spurt in foundings within an existing popu-
lation of business organizations, in other words a
mature industry. Industry maturity is often syn-
onymous with a few dominant firms, high entry
barriers and a low rate of entry. However, mature
industries often show a dramatic increase in the
number of firms. Typically this occurs as a result
of the founding of new kinds of organizations
that are different from incumbent firms. In the
parlance of Hannan and Freeman (1989), these
new entrants represent new organizational forms
—their formal structure, patterns of activity, and
normative order are different from those of
incumbent firms. It is important to develop an
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understanding of firm entry into new market seg-
ments of mature industries due to the prominent
role of entrants in the renewal and growth of
such industries (Abernathy and Clark, 1985).
In this paper I examine two alternative expla-
nations for firm entry into new market segments
in mature industries: niche formation and
resource-partitioning. The niche formation and
resource-partitioning arguments differ in the
extent to which they assume that the entry of
firms into new market segments in a mature
industry is driven by forces that are exogenous or
endogenous to the industry. The niche formation
argument emphasizes forces that are largely
exogenous to the industry (Delacroix and Solt,
1988). New market niches emerge as a result of
discontinuities in an industry’s environment.
These discontinuities may reflect changes in tech-
nology or consumer behavior (Tushman and And-
erson, 1986; Delacroix and Solt, 1988). In either
case, potential entrepreneurs recognize the oppor-
tunities afforded by the formation of the new
niche and enter the industry.
The alternative explanation for the entry of
firms into new market segments in a mature
industry relies on a process of resource-
partitioning (Carroll, 1985). According to the
resource-partitioning model, as industries mature
they come to be dominated by a few generalist
firms. These generalist firms attempt to maximize
their performance by drawing on the largest pos-
sible resource space, the center of the market.
This opens up pockets of resources on the periph-
ery of the market. Entrepreneurs then found
specialist firms to exploit these peripheral
resources. This process generates outcomes that
are consistent with the observation of competitive
fringes in many industries (Beesley and Hamilton,
1984). Thus the resource-partitioning model lays
greater emphasis on changes endogenous to the
generalist segment of industries. Movement
towards the center by generalists leads to
resource-partitioning which in turn creates con-
ditions that facilitate the entry of specialist firms.
The two explanations also imply varying
degrees of managerial initiative in the founding
of new specialist firms. The niche formation argu-
ment attaches a great deal of importance to the
ability of potential entrepreneurs to respond to
the emergence of a new niche. The resource-
partitioning model, however, assumes that adap-
tation constraints (Hannan and Freeman, 1984)
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prevent incumbent firms from moving into the
specialist niche. Instead, this space is likely to be
filled by new firms that thrive on the periphery, in
part because they avoid competing with the domi-
nant generalist firms. The niche formation and
resource-partitioning hypotheses are tested using
life-history data on the population of U.S. brew-
eries in the period 1939–95.
The next section consists of a brief overview of
trends in the post-Prohibition American brewing
industry. I then discuss the niche formation and
resource-partitioning models as they apply to the
entry of firms into new market segments in
mature industries. After this, I describe the data
and the methods to be used in testing the hypoth-
eses. Finally, I present the findings and discuss
their implications for the evolution of organi-
zational heterogeneity within industries.
THE U.S. BEER BREWING
INDUSTRY: 1933–95
The legality of the American industries producing
alcoholic beverages has been subject to question
throughout history. Several states have imposed
Prohibition at one time or another, the earliest
being Maine in 1846. In 1919, 36 states ratified
the 18th Amendment to enact national Prohi-
bition. This ban lasted until 1933, when it was
repealed. Most of the breweries founded immedi-
ately after Prohibition operated before Prohibition:
617 out of the 842 breweries founded in 1933–
34 were ‘restarts.’ New firm foundings are also
high in these 2 years (53 in 1933 and 172 in
1934). Both restarts and new firm foundings fell
to an insignificant number after 1950.
The number of breweries declined from a
maximum of 933 in 1934 to a minimum of 43
in 1981 and 1983. The decline in the number of
firms reflects not only brewery failures, but also
the greater incidence of mergers and acquisitions
(Tremblay and Tremblay, 1988). Since the repeal
of Prohibition, and particularly in the post-World
War II period, the American brewing industry
has undergone rapid concentration. The industry
four-firm concentration ratio has risen from 11
p rcent in 1935 to 78 percent in 1982 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1982) to 89.7 percent by
1995 (Modern Brewery Age, 1996). Most
observers consider this trend as evidence demon-
strating the operation of economies of scale in
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the industry (Scherer, 1980; Elzinga, 1986).
While the number of firms fell from 710 in 1935
to 43 in 1983, the total production of the industry
increased from 42 to 178 million barrels over the
same period. Thus the decline in the number of
firms does not represent unfavorable conditions
for the industry, but rather the increasing domi-
nation of the industry by a few large generalist
firms (Keithahn, 1978).
The American brewing industry witnessed a
spurt of new foundings beginning in the late
1970s. This recent burst of foundings has been
driven by the emergence of organizational forms
that are new in the post-Prohibition era—the
microbrewery and the brewpub (Institute for
[Fermentation and] Brewing Studies, various
years; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992). Both
microbreweries and brewpubs produce ale and
beer by traditional processes. Microbrewery prod-
ucts are available through regular distribution
channels, whereas brewpub products are available
only at the site of production. The first
microbrewery is recognized to be the New Albion
Brewery of Sonoma, California founded in 1977.
The brewpub is even more recent, the first one
being the Mendocino Brewing Company of Hop-
land, California founded in 1983. At last count
(January 1996), the number of brewpubs (516)
and microbreweries (287) far exceeded the num-
ber of generalist mass producers (24) in the
brewing industry.
Carroll and Swaminathan (1992) argue that
mass producers, microbreweries, and brewpubs
constitute separate organizational forms to the
extent that they encounter very different environ-
ments and respond differently to those distinct
environments. An examination of common strat-
egies followed by these organizational forms sug-
gests strong mobility barriers across these three
strategic groups (Caves and Porter, 1977; Mascar-
enhas and Aaker, 1989). The mass producer seg-
ment of the industry is characterized by strong
economies of scale in production and advertising
and extensive distribution networks. The
microbrewers, by contrast, target their products
for small upscale niches in the market and, at
least initially, are geographically localized. Devel-
opment of such markets is sometimes achieved
by promotional efforts but is often accomplished
through word of mouth. The cultivation of elite
networks is thus crucial to the performance and
survival of microbreweries. Gaining and main-
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taining regular access to such consumers can be
problematic, especially given the dominance of
distribution networks by the mass producers.
Finally, it is not clear that brewpubs compete
with the two other forms so much as they do
against local drinking and dining establishments.
Potential returns on investments can be quite
high, however, since the packaging and distri-
bution costs faced by other brewers are avoided
by this form.
In keeping with their localized specialist strat-
egies, the microbreweries and brewpubs are much
maller in size. For the period 1939–95, the
average annual production capacity of firms
ranged from 1391 barrels for brewpubs to 9871
barrels for microbreweries to 930,517 barrels for
mass producers. A specialist strategy is not the
only factor differentiating microbreweries and
brewpubs from mass producers. They differ also
in their formal structures. In accordance with
their smaller size they have fewer employees.
More importantly, however, entrepreneurs who
start up microbreweries or brewpubs often require
technical and brewing skills in addition to their
business acumen (Mares, 1991: 139). Mass pro-
ducers may be family-run enterprises, but they
usually hire technical staff for daily operations.
The normative order among microbreweries and
brewpubs is also considerably different. Co-
operation and not competition seems to be the
norm in mutual interaction. For example, it is
common for microbreweries and brewpubs in the
same area to negotiate shared bulk purchasing
agreements with suppliers of raw materials, to
share distribution channels and to jointly fund
promotional activities. In the next section, I
develop hypotheses that explain the entry of
microbreweries and brewpubs into the brewing




Delacroix and Solt (1988: 54) argue that found-
ings in the California wine industry are driven
by a niche formation process. They write:
A new niche may become available for a given
type of organization with the advent of new
technologies to perform old tasks, with the open-
ing of new environmental resources hitherto not
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accessible for tapping, or the emergence of new
ways to obtain resources from the environment
on the basis of unchanged technology.
According to Delacroix and Solt (1988), the
latter process of niche formation has been respon-
sible for the recent surge in winery foundings. In
their view, the new niche in the wine industry
evolved out of changes in lifestyle and associated
consumer preferences. A change in consumer
preferences is one among several exogenous fac-
tors that may lead to the creation of a new niche.
A new niche could also be formed as a result of
technological discontinuities. For example, found-
ings in the semiconductor manufacturing industry
seem to be driven by technological innovation
(Brittain and Freeman, 1980). Tushman and And-
erson (1986) account for product substitution
through technological changes which destroy the
competencies of incumbent firms. The emergence
of new product classes such as cement (in 1872),
airlines (in 1924), and plain-paper copying (in
1959) is attributed to basic technological inno-
vations. Innovation in production technology does
not seem to be a major force behind the entry
of firms into new market segments in the brewing
industry. In fact, in brewing the technology
employed by both microbreweries and brewpubs
is primitive by industry standards—it closely
resembles the technology in use over a century
ago.
Abernathy and Clark (1985: 18) suggest that
three specific kinds of environmental changes
might lead to the formation of a new niche.
First, new technological options offer improved
performance or new applications that cannot be
met by existing product designs. Second, changes
in government policy, especially in regulatory
regimes, may favor revolutionary strategic devel-
opment. Finally, changes in consumer preferences
may impose requirements that can be met only
through new design approaches. Delacroix and
Solt’s (1988) niche formation argument thus has
the same flavor as the process of ‘niche creation
innovation’ (Abernathy and Clark, 1985: 10–11)
where organizations build on existing technical
competence and apply it to emerging market seg-
ments. Given an underlying change in consumer
preferences, the influx of firms into a new market
segment or niche in a mature industry is likely
to be greater as the new market niche expands
in volume.
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Proposition 1: The greater the volume of a
new market niche in a mature industry, the
higher the founding rate of firms in that niche.
Delacroix and Solt (1988) use the level of wine
imports as an indicator of the volume of a new
iche comprising the table and sparkling wine
segments. Increases in the level of wine imports
have a strong positive effect on foundings in the
California wine industry. Delacroix and Solt
(1988) interpret this as evidence that niche forma-
tion increases the founding rate. It is even more
true in the case of brewing that imported products
come closest to resembling microbrewery and
brewpub products. Although Delacroix and Solt’s
(1988) analysis is not able to identify the organi-
zational form of entrants into new niches in the
wine industry, in the brewing industry it is clear
that new niches are being occupied by organi-
zations with new forms (Carroll and Swamina-
than, 1992). The niche formation argument would
suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the volume of beer
imports, the higher the founding rate of
microbreweries and brewpubs.
Resource-partitioning
Trends in organizational density—the number of
organizations in an industry—are often related to
trends in industrial concentration. As the number
of organizations declines, the market share held
by the largest few firms typically increases. Car-
roll (1985) developed a model of resource-
partitioning to account for the mortality rates of
specialist firms in environments characterized by
varying degrees of industrial concentration. By
definition, generalists depend on a wide range
of environmental resources for survival, whereas
specialists survive only within a narrow range of
environmental resources.
The level of industrial concentration has impli-
cations for the dispersion of resources within a
market. When the market is characterized by low
concentration levels it approximates the econo-
mists’ conception of a perfect, atomistic market.
That is, the market is composed of a large number
of generalist firms, each of which cannot indi-
vidually affect prevalent price levels. Firms tailor
their products or services to appeal to a slightly
different set of consumers. In terms of market
Entry into New Market Segments in Mature Industries 393
coverage, there is a certain degree of overlap
near the center, but the differentiated appeals
developed by individual firms ensures that each
generalist firm possesses a unique advantage in
certain market segments. The existence of these
partially intersecting strategies implies that a
larger proportion of the total market is covered.
The resource space available for specialists is
smaller—there are fewer market segments left
to exploit.
As the level of concentration in the market
rises, the death rate of generalist firms increases
as they compete with each other to gain control
over the center of the market. The surviving
generalist firms that come to dominate the market
are fewer in number and larger in size. The
degree of overlap in generalist firm strategies is
higher since most of them try to exploit resources
available at the market center. The total resource
space covered by generalist firms is smaller than
in the case of a competitive, unconcentrated mar-
ket where they offer differentiated products or
services. Therefore in the concentrated market
specialist firms have access to greater resources.
They can exploit peripheral market segments
without entering into direct competition with the
larger generalists. Greater resource availability
should improve the survival chances of such
specialist firms as the market concentrates. At
this point, the total market is partitioned into
generalized and specialized segments. In a con-
centrated market generalist and specialist firms
seem to operate in distinct resource spaces
whereas they relied on a common resource base
in an unconcentrated market.
The resource-partitioning model can easily be
extended to the founding process (Freeman and
Lomi, 1994; Lomi, 1995; Swaminathan, 1995).
High concentration in the market implies that
specialists can draw upon peripheral resources
without entering into direct competition with gen-
eralists. Increasing levels of market concentration
free more peripheral resources. Existing special-
ists may grow and survive longer by exploiting
such resources. The increased availability of
peripheral resources may also facilitate the
founding of specialist organizations. Therefore
Proposition 2: The greater the degree of
resource-partitioning within an industry, the
higher the founding rate of specialists.
In the brewing industry, generalists are represented
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by mass producers. New organizational forms—
microbreweries and brewpubs—are specialists.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of mar-
ket concentration in the brewing industry, the
higher the founding rate of microbreweries
and brewpubs.
The niche formation and resource-partitioning
hypotheses need to be tested with reference to a
baseline model of organizational founding among
microbreweries and brewpubs. In particular, this
baseline model ought to address three important
influences on the founding rate of firms in new
market segments within a mature industry: the
carrying capacity of the environment, density-
dependent evolution, and institutional support.
Below I sketch a baseline model of microbrewery
and brewpub founding that takes these influences
i to account.
Carrying capacity
Organizational founding rates are likely to be
higher when the excess carrying capacity of the
environment is greater (Brittain and Freeman,
1980; Pennings, 1982; Baum and Singh, 1994).
The carrying capacity of the environment for
microbreweries and brewpubs is likely to vary
across states. I model these state-level differences
i terms of three variables: the per capita personal
income of a state’s residents, the per capita beer
consumption of a state’s residents, and the per-
c ntage of a state’s population that lives in dry
areas. Although there is very little cross-ownership
of firms in the wine and brewing industries, it is
intriguing that new organizational forms in brewing
emerged shortly after equivalent forms had emerged
in the wine industry. It is appealing to argue that
developments in both populations reflect a common
underlying process—a change in lifestyle and
consumer demand for greater variety. These
developments are associated with the emergence
of small upscale niches comprising relatively
affluent consumers. Therefore states with higher
per capita incomes are likely to experience a
higher entry rate of microbreweries and brewpubs.
On the other hand, states that have a large pro-
portion of their populations living in dry areas
likely reflect persistent social norms that discour-
age the sale and consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages. In such states, microbrewery and brewpub
foundings are likely to be lower.
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Density-dependent evolution
According to a model of density-dependent
organizational evolution proposed by Hannan
(1986), the founding rate within an organizational
population increases when an organizational form
reaches higher levels of legitimacy and decreases
with increasing competition within the population
(see also Hannan and Carroll, 1992). The number
of organizations (or density) corresponds to the
processes of legitimation and competition. At low
levels of density, each addition to the population
facilitates the legitimation process and therefore
increases founding rates. As density increases and
approaches the environmental carrying capacity,
competitive processes set in and the effect of
density is reversed and it lowers the founding
rate. Thus, this model predicts that density depen-
dence in rates of founding is nonmonotonic.
Although the competitive effects of density are
intuitive, the positive effect of initial increases in
density on the organizational founding rate is
subject to interpretations other than the social
legitimation of the organizational form (Delacroix
and Rao, 1994). In particular, the legitimating
effects of density on the founding rate of organi-
zations with new forms can also be interpreted
as a case of learning at the population level
(Miner and Haunschild, 1995). Small businesses
are more likely to succeed if they are founded by
entrepreneurs who have failed at earlier attempts
(Mayer and Goldstein, 1961: 138–139). Stinch-
combe (1965: 152) notes that ‘the level of organi-
zational experience of a population is a main
determinant of their capacity to form new organi-
zations.’ I would argue that the acquisition of
learning and legitimacy through a proliferation
in numbers of a new organizational form are
complementary processes since they both occur
at the population level. In fact, these processes
may act in ways that reinforce each other.
The density-dependent model of organizational
evolution has been validated in several organi-
zational populations, including an earlier analysis
of microbrewery and brewpub foundings (Carroll
and Swaminathan, 1992). If microbreweries and
brewpubs are new organizational forms, then the
density model should apply to them separately.
Carroll and Swaminathan’s (1992) analysis of
microbrewery and brewpub founding rates over
1975–89 supports this view. Their results show
that microbreweries and brewpubs are subject to
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separate processes of legitimation and competition
based on form-specific counts of density at the
national level. The treatment of density-dependent
effects in this study improves upon Carroll and
Swaminathan’s (1992) analysis in significant
ways. First, in keeping with the localized strat-
gies of microbreweries and brewpubs, I model
form-specific density dependence in foundings of
these new organizational forms at the state level.
Second, I model interdependence between mass
producers, microbreweries, and brewpubs in a
differentiated manner. Microbreweries and brew-
pubs in the same state are expected to exhibit a
mutualistic relationship. Although they produce
similar products, they do not compete directly
since brewpub products are consumed on their
premises whereas microbrewery products have
to reach consumers through regular distribution
channels. Unlike microbreweries and brewpubs,
the impact of generalist mass production brew-
eries is likely to be felt nationwide. Mass pro-
ducers are likely to exert a competitive effect on
microbreweries since their products are designed
for at-home consumption and distributed through
the same channels. The modeling choices
described above are consistent with Hannan and
Carroll’s (1992: 208–209) recommendation that
the level of analysis chosen to model density-
dependent effects ought to capture most of the
competition occurring among similar organi-
zations (see also Singh, 1993; Budros, 1994).
Institutional support
A supportive institutional environment is likely
to foster higher organizational founding rates.
Institutional support is often provided in the form
of government regulations that protect infant or
endangered organizations (Carroll, Delacroix, and
Goodstein, 1988), laws that structure industry
competition in particular ways (Barnett and Car-
roll, 1993), or financial incentives that encourage
entrepreneurial activity (Tucker, Singh, and Mein-
hard, 1990). Tuckeret al. (1990) found that the
establishment of the ‘Opportunities for Youth’
program between 1971 and 1975 legitimated and
provided additional resources for voluntary social
service organizations (VSSOs) in Canada. Conse-
quently, specialist VSSOs were founded at a
much higher rate during this period. Budros
(1992) found that the passage of New York’s
Insurance Incorporation Act stimulated the found-
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ing of insurance carriers in the state. Similarly,
in the brewing industry the legalization of brew-
pubs by individual states might signify a more
supportive institutional environment for new
organizational forms in the brewing industry. By
definition, brewpubs could not be founded before
they became legal. A more intriguing possibility
is that microbreweries were founded at higher
rates in states that legalized brewpubs.
DATA AND METHODS
Data
Bull, Friedrich, and Gottschalk’s (1984)American
Breweriesconstitutes the primary source of event-
history data for the population of brewing firms.
This data source includes information on all
American beer producers except those who pro-
duce under contract to others. The data have
been verified using annual lists of brewing firms
published in theModern Brewery Age Bluebooks
(Modern Brewery Age, various years) and the
Brewers Almanac (U.S. Brewers Association,
various years) which uses the Department of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as its primary
source. The historical coverage has been extended
to 1995 by including information gathered from
Tremblay and Tremblay (1988) and the
Microbrewery Resource Handbooks(Institute for
[Fermentation and] Brewing Studies, various
years). From the event-history data, I calculated
counts of density, foundings, and deaths in any
given year. Four-firm concentration ratios were
calculated as the combined market share of the
four largest firms. These estimates are based on
sales data reported in theModern Brewery Age
Bluebooksand theMicrobrewery Resource Hand-
books. Data on beer imports have been obtained
from the Brewers Almanac. Data on the total
production of microbreweries and brewpubs have
been derived by aggregating individual firm pro-
duction figures which are available in theModern
Brewery Age Bluebooksand the Microbrewery
Resource Handbooks. Descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the analyses are given in Tables
1 and 2.
Since microbreweries are at risk of founding
in all states during the entire observation period,
the analysis of microbrewery founding rates
covers 51 states (including the District of
Columbia) over a 57-year period (1939–95). Data
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on per capita income and state population are not
available for Alaska and Hawaii for a total of 42
state-years. Therefore the analysis includes 2865
(51 states× 57 years −42) state-year spells.
Brewpubs are at risk of founding only after the
organizational form is legalized in a given state.
California and Washington were the first states
to legalize the form in 1982. Given that brewpubs
are such a recent phenomenon, the analysis of
brewpub founding rates includes only 305 state-
year spells.
Methods
In modeling the organizational founding process,
I follow convention in defining the population as
the unit of analysis and treat foundings as events
in a point process (Cox and Isham, 1980; Ambur-
gey and Carroll, 1984; Amburgey, 1986). Because
the dates of founding often record only the year
of founding, I do not know the ordering of events
within years. Nor do I know the exact duration
between foundings. In doing work of this kind,
organizational ecologists have typically assumed
a constant rate of founding with log-linear depen-
dence on covariates (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).
This approach assumes that, conditional on the
values of the covariates, a time series of annual
counts of foundings is the realization of a Poisson
process. This implies that the number of found-
ings in year t, Yt, is determined by the prob-
ability law:
Pr(Yt = yt) = exp(−lt) lyt t/yt! (1)
The relationship between the founding rate,lt
and the vector of covariates,xt, is specified as fol-
lows:
ln lt = a + bxt (2)
Some implications of the Poisson model are
that the expected number of events in a given
year t is equal to the mean founding rate,lt and
that the variance of the number of events equals
lt. Poisson regression methods typically estimate
the regression parameters by using the Poisson
probability law in Equation 1 to form likelihoods
for the data and then employ methods for
maximum likelihood estimation. This approach
has important advantages over methods based on
conventional regression analysis of time series
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis of microbrewery foundingsa
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Number of state-level microbrewery foundings 0.117 0.680 0 19
State microbrewery density 0.319 1.479 0 29
Out-of-state microbrewery density 15.969 36.227 0 192
State brewpub density 0.476 3.268 0 76
National mass producer density 182.631 173.236 23 641
Industry concentration (4-firm ratio as a 46.945 25.274 13.5 90.0
percentage)
Volume of imports (millions of gallons) 2.630 3.372 0.031 10.489
Brewpub legality (1= legal; 0 = illegal) 0.107 0.309 0 1
Brewpub legality× state microbrewery density 0.259 1.436 0 29
State per capita annual personal income 10.487 3.876 1.817 25.246
(thousands of constant 1987 dollars)
State per capita annual beer consumption 18.275 6.682 1.6 40.4
(gallons)
% of state population living in dry areas 5.99 12.33 0 63.11
aN = 2865 for all variables
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis of brewpub foundingsa
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Number of state-level brewpub foundings 1.928 3.312 0 26
State brewpub density 4.416 9.116 0 76
Out-of-state brewpub density 173.328 106.324 0 352
State microbrewery density 2.436 3.756 0 29
National mass producer density 25.007 2.243 23 33
Industry concentration (4-firm ratio as a 87.310 2.450 75.9 90.0
percentage)
Volume of imports (millions of gallons) 8.954 0.884 5.754 10.489
State per capita annual personal income 16.152 2.504 11.63 25.246
(thousands of constant 1987 dollars)
State per capita annual beer consumption 23.447 3.822 12.7 37.7
(gallons)
% of state population living in dry areas 4.055 9.787 0 46.35
aN = 305 for all variables
data on foundings. Most importantly, OLS or
GLS regression methods used in early studies
of organizational foundings (see, for example,
Delacroix and Carroll, 1983) do not take into
account the non-negativity of event counts or the
discontinuous nature of count data.
However, assuming that a series of counts of
foundings is a realization of a Poisson process
means assuming that the occurrence of an event
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is independent of previous events. It also means
assuming that the expected number of foundings
in a year equals the variance of the number of
foundings in that year. Both these assumptions
are problematic in the analysis of founding rates,
where the variance of event counts often exceeds
the mean, a condition called ‘overdispersion’.
Either unobserved heterogeneity in founding rates
or positive ‘contagion’ can generate overdisper-
Entry into New Market Segments in Mature Industries 397
sion. In this case, contagion means that the occur-
rence of an event affects the rate of subsequent
occurrence. There is reason to believe that both
sources of overdispersion are evident in the
organizational founding process. Adopting the
Poisson model in such a situation can lead to
misleadingly small standard errors for the esti-
mated coefficients (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches,
1984). Instead, I use the negative binomial model
which overcomes this limitation of the Poisson
model through the inclusion of an overdispersion
parameter (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Ranger-
Moore, Banaszak-Holl, and Hannan, 1991; Bar-
ron, 1992). That is, the relationship between the
founding rate,lt, and the vector of covariates,
xt, is now specified as follows:
ln lt = a + bxt + e (3)
where e has a gamma distribution. This model
assumes that the coefficient of variation of the
expected count increases linearly with the
expected count. It has an additional overdisper-
sion parameter,u, where
Var(Yt) = E(Yt) (1 + uE[Yt]) (4)
Settingu = 0 in Equation 4 simplifies the negative
binomial model to a Poisson model. Thus one
can form likelihood ratio tests of the Poisson
process vs. the negative binomial. The likelihood
ratio test statistic is defined as
m = max L0/max L1 (5)
where L0 and L1 denote the likelihoods of the
null model (subject to, say,n constraints) and
the alternative model that relaxes the constraints
respectively. With large samples,−2ln m is dis-
tributed as a chi-square withn degrees of free-
dom. I report this statistic as the log-likelihood
chi-squared ratio for the founding models in my
tables. The log-likelihood chi-squared ratio com-
pares the log-likelihood of each model with a
null model that assumes a constant founding rate.
The difference of log-likelihood chi-squared ratios
of a pair of hierarchically nested models in my
tables has approximately a chi-square distribution
under the null hypothesis.
I use maximum likelihood methods available
in the statistical package LIMDEP (Greene, 1995)
to estimate the founding models. Maximum likeli-
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hood estimation revealed that models of founding
rates for both microbreweries and brewpubs con-
sistently show evidence of overdispersion. Hence
I report negative binomial regression models of
microbrewery and brewpub founding counts.
FINDINGS
Table 3 presents estimates from negative binomial
regression models of state-level microbrewery
foundings. Model 1 shows that the variables mea-
suring the carrying capacity of the environment
affect the microbrewery founding rate in predict-
able ways. States with more affluent residents
and higher beer consumption experience higher
microbrewery founding rates. Indirect institutional
support also encourages microbrewery foundings.
Microbrewery foundings are accelerated by the
egalization of brewpubs, an organizational form
that also draws on the local market for suste-
nance. The overdispersion parameter,u, is sta-
tistically significant in all models in Table 3.
Density dependence in microbrewery founding
rates is addressed in Model 2. Microbrewery
founding rates initially rise and then fall with
increases in local (state-level) microbrewery den-
sity. This result is consistent with the predictions
of Hannan’s (1986) model of density dependence.
Nonlocal (out-of-state) microbrewery density also
has a positive effect on the state-level founding
rate. The mutualistic effect of nonlocal micro-
breweries is somewhat surprising given the
expansion of some prominent microbrewers into
regional and in some cases national distribution
of their products. One interpretation of this result
is that entry into new market segments is a
contagious process that operates on a broad geo-
graphic level. A large number of viable firms
existing in nonlocal areas may indicate that the
new market niche has a large carrying capacity,
thus attracting potential local entrepreneurs.
Microbrewery founding rates are not affected by
state-level brewpub density, but are negatively
impacted by mass producer density. This is to be
expected as microbreweries preceded brewpubs
as an organizational form and they compete more
directly with mass producers in output markets.
In Model 3, I find that the effect of brewpub
legalization on microbrewery foundings is more
complex than it would seem from Model 1. The













Table 3. Negative binomial regression models of state-level microbrewery foundings
Independent variables Modelsa
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant −8.371* −2.907* −3.119* −4.743* −5.474* −2.308
(0.960) (0.941) (0.955) (1.178) (2.445) (2.790)
State per capita annual personal income 0.3021* 0.0594 0.0645* 0.0618 0.0638 0.0622
(thousands of constant 1987 dollars) (0.0467) (0.0319) (0.0326) (0.0333) (0.0329) (0.0332)
State per capita annual beer consumption (gallons) 0.0547* 0.0244 0.0199 0.0184 0.0200 0.0179
(0.0262) (0.0238) (0.0244) (0.0249) (0.0245) (0.0250)
% of state population living in dry areas −0.0115 −0.0067 −0.0060 −0.0065 −0.0060 −0.0067
(0.0143) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0120)
Brewpub legality 1.9707* 0.2648 0.5785* 0.5496* 0.5419* 0.5910*
(1 = legal; 0 = illegal) (2.057) (0.1841) (0.2253) (0.2278) (0.2290) (0.2321)
State microbrewery density 0.3681* 0.5184* 0.5283* 0.5219* 0.5282*
(0.0373) (0.0499) (0.0525) (0.0520) (0.0526)
(State microbrewery density)2/100 −1.0027* −0.8871* −0.9010* −0.8863* −0.9099*
(0.1806) (0.2257) (0.2339) (0.2287) (0.2336)
Out-of-state microbrewery density 0.0075* 0.0068* 0.0041 0.0059* 0.0044*
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0022)
State brewpub density −0.0019 0.0015 0.0044 0.0016 0.0054
(0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0142)
National mass producer density −0.0394* −0.0359* −0.0182* −0.0207 −0.0296*
(0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0085) (0.0122) (0.0127)
Brewpub legality× state microbrewery density −0.1879* −0.2039* −0.1923* −0.2046*
(0.0625) (0.0658) (0.0641) (0.0657)
Volume of imports 0.1754* .2042*
(millions of gallons) (0.0831) (0.1184)
Industry concentration 0.0243 −0.0321
(4-firm ratio as a percentage) (0.0249) (0.0357)
u 2.1795* 0.2620* 0.2876* 0.3020* 0.2986* 0.2970*
(overdispersion parameter) (0.3136) (0.1221) (0.1338) (0.1333) (0.1378) (0.1306)
Log likelihood chi-squared ratio 1228.2 1452.6 1459.0 1464.5 1459.8 1465.3
Degrees of freedom 5 10 11 12 12 13
Number of cases 2865 2865 2865 2865 2865 2865
Number of events 335 335 335 335 335 335
*p , 0.05
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tive. But the interaction of brewpub legalization
with microbrewery density exerts a negative
effect on the microbrewery founding rate. In other
words, the effect of brewpub legalization on
microbrewery founding rates varies over levels
of microbrewery density. The estimates in Model
3 suggest that if four or more microbreweries
exist in a state, the overall effect of brewpub
legalization on microbrewery founding rates is
negative. One interpretation of this finding is that
once brewpubs are legalized, entrepreneurs can
choose to enter either the more established
microbrewery or the fledgling brewpub segment.
Higher levels of microbrewery density under such
conditions imply greater competition. Therefore
potential entrepreneurs may choose to enter the
brewpub segment instead. This interpretation is
also consistent with an unfolding of the resource-
partitioning process within the microbrewery seg-
ment of the industry.
Models 4 and 5 test the niche formation and
resource-partitioning arguments separately. Model
4 supports Hypothesis 1. Microbrewery founding
rates increase with the volume of imports (the
indicator of niche formation). Model 5 does not
support Hypothesis 2—the effect of industry con-
centration (the indicator of resource-partitioning)
on the microbrewery founding rate is negligible.
Finally, Model 6 pits the niche formation and
resource-partitioning explanations for the entry of
firms into new market segments in mature indus-
tries against each other. The results suggest that
niche formation is primarily responsible for the
entry of microbreweries into the brewing industry.
The effect of factors endogenous to the industry
implied in the resource-partitioning hypothesis are
insignificant once the exogenous changes sug-
gested by the niche formation scenario are taken
into account. The effects of microbrewery density
and brewpub legalization on microbrewery found-
ing rates are consistent with earlier models. To
test the robustness of Model 6, I added a variable
signifying the population mass of microbreweries
(annual production output). Barnett and Ambur-
gey (1990: 82–84) argued that if larger organi-
zations within a population generate stronger
competition, then population mass should lower
the founding rate. In this supplementary model,
estimates of which are not provided here, I found
that population mass does not affect the founding
rate of the microbreweries significantly. Parameter
estimates of variables included in Model 6, how-
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ever, are robust to the addition of the population
mass variable. The lack of a population mass
effect may signify a great degree of differentiation
within the microbrewery population.
Table 4 presents estimates from negative
binomial regression models of state-level brewpub
foundings. Model 7 shows that the carrying
capacity variables affect the brewpub founding
rate in intuitive ways. The effect of the income
variable is statistically significant in Model 7, but
loses its significance in subsequent models. The
overdispersion parameter,u, is statistically sig-
nificant in all models in Table 4. Model 8
accounts for density-dependent effects on the
brewpub founding rate. As predicted by the den-
sity model (Hannan, 1986), state-level brewpub
density exerts a nonmonotonic effect on state-
level brewpub founding rates. Given the local
nature of the brewpub segment, it is not surprising
that national mass producer density does not exert
an appreciable effect on the brewpub founding
rate. Out-of-state brewpub density has a positive,
but inconsistent effect on the brewpub founding
rate, adding credence to the ‘entrepreneurship as
contagion’ explanation offered earlier for nonlocal
effects on microbrewery foundings. In addition,
state-level microbrewery density has a positive
effect on the state-level brewpub founding rate.
This result suggests that the spread of the
microbrewery organizational form had a legi-
timating effect on the founding process of brew-
pubs.
Models 9 through 11 test the two alternative
Hypotheses 1 and 2 derived from niche formation
and resource-partitioning theory. The results sug-
gest that the founding of firms in the brewpub
segment of the U.S. brewing industry is mainly
driven by the niche formation process. The
greater the volume of beer imports, the indicator
of niche formation, the greater the brewpub
f unding rate. This result supports Hawley’s
(1988) suggestion that niche emergence may be
partly responsible for the generation of new
organizations. As in the case of microbreweries,
I found that the parameter estimates in Model 11
were robust with respect to the addition of a
variable, total brewpub production, that is a proxy
for population mass. It is interesting that the
entry of firms into the microbrewery and brewpub
segments of the U.S. brewing industry is better
explained by niche formation than by resource-













Table 4. Negative binomial regression models of state-level brewpub foundings
Independent variables Modelsa
7 8 9 10 11
Constant −1.491 −2.652 −4.487* −3.147 11.120
(1.083) (1.486) (1.495) (8.902) (9.389)
State per capita annual personal income 0.1417* 0.0013 −0.0028 0.0012 −0.0026
(thousands of constant 1987 dollars) (0.0461) (0.0340) (0.0331) (0.0341) (0.0328)
State per capita annual beer consumption −0.0060 0.0282 0.0231 0.0282 0.0229
(gallons) (0.0229) (0.0203) (0.0193) (0.0204) (0.0201)
% of state population living in dry areas −0.0152 −0.0041 −0.0056 −0.0042 −0.0052
(0.0153) (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0109)
State brewpub density 0.0978* 0.0986* 0.0977* 0.1025*
(0.0216) (0.0211) (0.0223) (0.0216)
(State microbrewery density)2/100 −1.1222* −0.1209* −0.1220* −0.1250*
(0.0309) (0.0344) (0.0317) (0.0335)
Out-of-state brewpub density 0.0027* 0.0002 0.0026* 0.0018
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0013)
State microbrewery density 0.0844* 0.0725* 0.0842* 0.0741*
(0.0264) (0.0260) (0.0265) (0.0262)
National mass producer density 0.0531 0.0061 0.0559 −0.0883
(0.0446) (0.0452) (0.0613) (0.0663)
Volume of imports 0.4037* 0.4897*
(millions of gallons) (0.0966) (0.1047)
Industry concentration 0.0050 −0.1639
(4-firm ratio as a percentage) (0.0903) (0.0969)
u 1.3736* 0.5225* 0.4571* 0.5222* 0.4502*
(overdispersion parameter) (0.1629) (0.0975) (0.0920) (0.0975) (0.0914)
Log likelihood chi-squared ratio 476.9 604.1 621.2 604.1 624.9
Degrees of freedom 4 9 10 10 11
Number of cases 305 305 305 305 305
Number of events 588 588 588 588 588
*p , 0.05
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these findings among others in the discussion
that follows.
DISCUSSION
This paper examined two alternative explanations
for the entry of firms into new market segments
in mature industries. First, niche formation theory
derives its explanatory power from factors that
are exogenous to the industry such as changes
in consumer taste or basic technology. These
exogenous changes create unmet demand for new
products and services, and entrepreneurs recogniz-
ing potential opportunities found organizations,
often with new forms. Second, resource-
partitioning theory relies on structural changes
within an industry that lead to the fragmenting of
the industry into generalist and specialist niches.
Generalist organizations focus on producing
standardized products and services for the mass
market. Opportunities in the specialist niche are
ignored either because they are unattractive due
to a lack of scale economies or because of organi-
zational inertia. The reluctance or the inability of
generalist organizations to expand into the
specialist niche allows organizations with new
specialist forms to be founded in mature indus-
tries. Tests of these two theories on the entry of
firms into the microbrewery and brewpub seg-
ments of the American brewing industry provide
strong support for the niche formation hypothesis.
The lack of support for the resource-partitioning
model may stem from at least two limitations of
this study. First, we may have to measure the
degree of resource-partitioning more appropri-
ately. Second, we may need to reconceptualize
the resource-partitioning process.
Market concentration has been used widely as
a measure of resource-partitioning, but it is a
weak proxy at best. At the heart of the resource-
partitioning model is an argument that a decline
in organizational diversity within an industry will
lead to the entry of new specialist firms. Rather
than employ market concentration as an inverse
measure of organizational diversity, it would be
preferable to measure organizational diversity
within an industry directly in terms of diversity
in technologies, products, markets, and internal
structures.
Resource-partitioning has been typically con-
ceptualized as a one-time phenomenon. For
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example, the design of this study assumed that
increasing market concentration and the ac-
companying decline in product diversity among
mass production breweries would simultaneously
create opportunities for specialist firms in the
microbrewing and brewpub segments of the brew-
ing industry. In contrast, I would like to suggest
a different approach, one that conceptualizes
resource-partitioning as a continuous, cyclical
process that repeats itself as industries and, more
generally, market niches within them mature.
By virtue of their producing and marketing
packaged products, microbreweries exhibit greater
interdependence with mass production breweries.
The brewpub organizational form occupies a
niche that is far removed from the mass producer
egment. This reasoning is partly supported by
the effects of mass producer density on the entry
of firms into the microbrewing and brewpub seg-
ments. This study considers the effect of resource-
partitioning due to structural changes in the mass
producer segment on the entry of firms into new
market segments in a mature industry. Resource-
partitioning within the mass producer segment of
an industry is more likely to affect the entry of
firms into the new market segment that has a
greater overlap with the mass producer segment,
in this case the microbrewery segment.
The intriguing effects of brewpub legalization
on microbrewery foundings suggest that similar
forces may be at work within the microbrewing
egment of the industry. One interpretation of
these effects is that brewpubs are a variation of
microbreweries that arise due to structural
changes within the microbrewing segment of the
ndustry. Microbrewery foundings may be lower
in states that have legalized brewpubs because
entrepreneurs react to overcrowding in the
microbrewery segment and found brewpubs
instead. This interpretation is consistent with
results that show a positive effect of microbrew-
ry density on the brewpub founding rate in a
given state. Brewpub products may find easier
acceptance in states with a significant microbrew-
ery presence—consumers can now buy similar
products for consumption at and away from
home. In states where brewpubs are legal,
microbreweries often serve as organizational blue-
prints for entrepreneurs planning to enter the
industry. But if the microbrewing segment is
crowded or dominated by a few firms then poten-
tial entrepreneurs are likely to found a brewpub,
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an organizational form that is new to the craft
brewing segment of the brewing industry. A
thorough examination of the cyclical nature of
the resource-partitioning would require data on
market concentration in the microbrewery seg-
ment of the industry. Reliable data on micro-
brewery sales are now available for the past 8
years (Institute for Brewing Studies, 1996), but
a longer time frame is probably required for an
adequate test of the modified resource-partitioning
hypothesis. I plan to continue collecting such
data so that I can examine this proposition in
the future.
My attempt to conceptualize resource-parti-
tioning as a continuous cycle within an industry
is consistent with punctuated models of industry
evolution. High levels of industry concentration
in mature industries often reflect the success of
dominant mass production firms at producing
low-cost standardized products. But in direct
opposition to this very trend toward standardiz-
ation emerges another trend towards differen-
tiation. There is some anecdotal and empirical
evidence in support of such a dialectical, cyclical
process. Petersen and Berger (1975) argue, for
instance, that specialist forms in the music indus-
try attempt to expand by standardizing their prod-
ucts, thus renewing the concentration process.
Similarly, Anderson and Tushman (1990) propose
a cyclical model of technological change where
the emergence of a dominant design sets the
stage for an era of incremental change abruptly
followed by the next technological discontinuity.
In examining the sources of dominant designs in
four industries—cement, container glass, flat
glass, and minicomputers—they find that on the
average new entrants are more likely to introduce
designs that destroy the technological competence
of incumbent firms. While Anderson and Tush-
man (1990) focus on technological evolution, this
study addresses the evolution of market niches
within an industry and the organizational forms
that occupy these niches. In this case, the emerg-
ence of a dominant organizational form sets the
stage for a discontinuity in product markets, a
discontinuity that is often introduced through the
entry of organizations with new forms (see also
Romanelli, 1991: 93–96 for a recent discussion
of organizational speciation).
This paper evaluates two alternative theories,
niche formation and resource-partitioning, that
seek to explain the entry of firms into new market
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segments within a mature industry. Entrants with
new organizational forms contribute to an
increase in organizational diversity within an
industry. An understanding of the sources of
diversity is central to an evolutionary perspective
on organizations and industries. At an abstract
level, a system characterized by greater diversity
can respond better to changing environmental
conditions. In terms of industry structure, one
that is composed of firms manufacturing a diverse
set of products is more likely to satisfy the
eeds of a heterogeneous market. Although the
conclusions drawn here are based on findings
from the brewing industry, they are broadly gen-
eralizable to the entry of firms into new market
segments in mature industries that are charac-
terized by low levels of organizational density
accompanied by high degrees of concentration.
Similar structural conditions exist in industries
such as newspapers, book publishing, music re-
cording, retailing, life insurance agencies, adver-
tising, and managerial consulting. In fact, since
the resource-partitioning process is likely to have
occurred at an earlier time in some of these
organizational populations, they might provide
added insight, particularly with regard to the
prevalence of a cyclical process of resource-
partitioning within newly emerging segments of
an industry.
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